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I. FRAGMENTATION
The system of international law has become increasingly fragmented,
particularly since the end of the Cold War. This paper intends to present
the main features of this development and its implications. Various factors
are responsible for the increased fragmentation:
* The proliferation of international regulations;
* Professor of International Law of the Vienna University, Member of the ILC 1996-
2001, Associate Member of the Institut de Droit International. This contribution is based on
the paper submitted to the International Law Commission, Gerhard Hafner, The Risk Ensuing
from Fragmentation of International Law, in REPORT OF THE INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMIS-
SION ON ITS 52ND SESSION, U.N. GAOR, 55th Sess., Suppl. 10, at 321-39, U.N. Doc. No.
ILC(LII)/WG/LT/INFORMAL/2 (2000).
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" Increasing political fragmentation (juxtaposed with growing
regional and global interdependence in such areas as
economics, the environment, energy, resources, health, and
the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction);
* The regionalization of international law due to a rise in the
number of regional fora engaged in the formulation of inter-
national regulations;
* The emancipation of individuals from States;' and
" The specialization of international regulations.2
Presently, there exists no homogeneous system of international law.3
International law consists of erratic blocks and elements; different partial
systems; and universal, regional, or even bilateral subsystems and sub-
subsystems of different levels of legal integration. All these parts
interacting with one another create what may paradoxically be called an
"unorganized system "'5 full of intra-systematic tensions, contradictions
and frictions.
In theory, fragmentation could have either positive or negative ef-
fects on the rule of law in international relations:
* On the one hand, fragmentation could have the positive effect6
of inducing States to comply more strictly with international
law. States would more inclined to comply with norms of a
I. This emancipation could lead to differentiated regulations and, consequently, norms
with different obligations.
2. See Ian Brownlie, Problems Concerning the Unity of International Law, in LE
DROIT INTERNATIONAL X L'HEURE DE SA CODIFICATION: ETUDES EN L'HONNEUR DE ROBERTO
AGO 153, 156 (Dott. A. Giuffr6 ed., 1987).
3. Cf Joseph A. Camilleri, Fragmentation and Integration: The Future of World Poli-
tics, in 2 CONFLICT RESOLUTION THROUGH NON-VIOLENCE 45 (K.D. Gangrade & R.P. Misra
eds., 1990); Moonis Raza, Citizens of a Wounded Earth in a Fragmented World, in 2 CoN-
FLICT RESOLUTION THROUGH NON-VIOLENCE 11, 22 (K.D. Gangrade & R.P. Misra eds.,
1990).
4. On the increase of fragmentation, in particular after the end of the Cold War, see
Jost Delbruck, A More Effective International Law or a New "World Law? "-Some Aspects of
the Changing Development of International Law in a Changing International System, 68 IND.
L.J. 705 (1993); Earl H. Fry, Sovereignty and Federalism: U.S. and Canadian Perspectives:
Challenges to Sovereignty and Governance, 20 CAN.-U.S. L.J. 303 (1994); Michael W. Reis-
man, International Law after the Cold War, 84 AM. J. INT'L L. 859, 864 (1990).
5. Karl Zemanek, The Legal Foundations of the International System: General Course
on Public International Law, 266 RECUEIL DES COURS: COLLECTED COURSES OF THE HAGUE
ACADEMY OF INT'L L. 62 (1997).
6. See SERGIO SALINAS ALCEGA & CARMEN TIRADO ROBLES, ADAPTABILIDAD Y
FRAGMENTACION DES DERECHO INTERNACTIONAL: LA CRISIS DE LA SECTORIALIZACION (97
ZARAGOZA, 1999); see also Stefan Kirchner, Relative Normativity and the Constitutional
Dimension of International Law: A Place for Values in the International Legal System?, 5
GERMAN L.J. (2004), at http://www.germanlawjoumal.com/article.php?id=36 I #edn 1.
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regional nature that better reflect the particular political situa-
tion of the States in that region.
On the other hand, fragmentation could generate negative
effects by exposing the frictions and contradictions between
the various legal regulations and imposing on States mutually
exclusive obligations.
II. ILLUSTRATIVE CASES
Before exploring its benefits and drawbacks, it is useful to identify
several examples of the fragmentation of international law and the poten-
tial for conflict among different subsystems.
A. International Criminal Tribunal
for Former Yugoslavia
The ICTY could require a State to take certain measures that are not
in conformity with the same State's obligations under human rights con-
ventions. Article 103 of the Charter of the United Nations deprives
States of the right to invoke such conventions, irrespective of the fact
that the individual concerned may bring the matter before the relevant
human rights bodies! Furthermore, if the individual concerned does re-
fer the matter to a relevant human rights body, it will be confined to
examining whether or not the State has violated the related human rights
convention. Existing international law does not provide a clear guidance
for solving this problem.'
Similar situations occur as a result of the application of targeted
sanctions adopted by the Security Council, and instances of judicial in-
tervention in this issue, such as that by the European Court of Human
Rights or the European Court of Justice, have failed to generate a satis-
factory solution.9 In the Dorsch case, the ECJ wrote that, in light of "the
7. See Johan G. Lammers, Challenging the Establishment of the ICTY before the
Dutch Courts: The Case of Slobodan Milosevic v. The Netherlands, in REVIEW OF THE SECU-
RITY COUNCIL BY MEMBER STATES 107 (Erika de Wet & Andrd Nollkaemper eds., 2003).
8. See August Reinisch, The UN Tribunal for Yugoslavia and the Procedural Guaran-
tees of the ICCPR: In Re Binding Effect of Non-Ratified Treaty Law for the UN, 47 AUSTRIAN
J. PUBL. INT'L L. 173 (1995); Gerhard Hafner, Should One Fear the Proliferation of Mecha-
nisms for the Peaceful Settlement of Disputes?, in THE PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES
BETWEEN STATES: UNIVERSAL AND EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVES 25 (Lucius Caflisch ed., 1998);
see also Symposium, Proliferation of International Tribunals: Piecing Together the Puzzle, 31
N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 679 (1999).
9. See Erika de Wet, The Role of Human Rights in Limiting the Enforcement Power of
the Security Council: A Principled View, in REVIEW OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL BY MEMBER
STATES 7, 24 (Erika de Wet & Andr6 Nollkaemper eds., 2003).
Summer 2004]
Michigan Journal of International Law
objective of general interest so fundamental for the international com-
munity of bringing to an end the invasion and occupation of Kuwait by
Iraq and maintaining international peace and security in the region, the
damage alleged by the applicant, even if it were capable of being classi-
fied as substantial cannot render the Community liable in this case. '
B. Immunity and Human Rights Obligations
Similar to the issue of potential conflict between the ICTY and hu-
man rights conventions is the question of whether immunity based on
international agreements or general international law may be invoked
before human rights bodies by States as exceptions to their obligations
under human rights conventions. In the case of Richard Waite and Terry
Kennedy," the European Commission of Human Rights concluded that
no violation of Article 6, paragraph 1 of the Convention had occurred
because a reasonable relationship of proportionality existed between the
rules of international immunity and the legitimate aims pursued by the
European Space Agency (ESA) as an international organization. This
conclusion was confirmed by the European Court of Human Rights. 2
C. International Trade Regulations and International
Environmental Regulations
Another example of potential conflict between different rules of in-
ternational law is the relationship between international regulations
dealing with international trade and international regulations intended to
promote the protection of the environment and sustainable develop-
ment. 3 Clearly certain tensions between various norms of international
10. See Case T-184/95, Dorsch Consult Ingenieurgesellschaft mbH v. Council of the
European Union and Comm'n of the European Comtys., 1998 E.C.R. 11-667, aff'd, C-237/98
P, Dorsch Consult Ingenieurgesellschaft mbH v. Council of the European Union and Comm'n
of the European Comtys., 2000 E.C.R. 1-4549.
11. Eur. Comm. H. R., Richard Waite and Terry Kennedy v. Germany, App. No.
26083/94 Report of the Commission adopted on 2 December 1997, paras. 53-54; see also Eur.
Comm. H. R., App. No. 28934/95 Beer and Regan v. Germany, Report of the Commission
adopted on 2 December 1997.
12. See Eur. Comm. H.R., Waite and Kennedy v. Germany, App. No. 26083/94 Report
of the Commission adopted on 18 February 1999, para. 73; Eur. Comm. of H.R., App. No.
28934/95 Beer and Regan v. Germany, Report of the Commission adopted on 18 February
1999.
13. Cf e.g., the works undertaken by the GATT Working Party on Environmental
Measures and International Trade (now the Trade and Environment Committee of the WTO)
or the OECD Trade and Environment Expert Committee. Cf also Candice Stevens, OECD
Trade and Environment Programme, I REV. OF EUR. COMMUNITY & INT'L ENVTL. L. 55
(1992).
[Vol. 25:849
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law may arise in this relationship. 4 Similar situations can occur in the
relations between international trade regulations, in particular within the
framework of the World Trade Organization, and human rights."5
D. International Regulations on Broadcasting
Attempts to regulate satellite broadcasting-by the International
Telecommunication Union (ITU) on the one hand and UNESCO on the
other-also exhibit the potential for conflict. Doubts remain about the
compatibility of UNESCO principles and the relevant regulations elabo-
rated by the ITU.1
6
E. The Law of the Sea Convention and
International Fisheries Treaties
A recent case before the United Nations Law of the Sea Tribunal, the
Southern Bluefin Tuna Case, clearly demonstrates the problems incurred
by the applicability of more than one regulation to a given case." A simi-
lar problem arose in connection with the MOX Plant case where the
regime under the United Nations Convention on the law of the Sea of
1982 conflicted with the system under EC law.8 Consequently, clear le-
gal devices are needed to ensure harmonious regulations.
F. The Application of the General Legal System to Special
Regimes and Regulations
The fragmentation or specialization of international regimes and
regulations also raises questions of whether and how to apply general
international law, in particular that of a secondary nature, to special
14. See, e.g., Appendix 1: Multilateral Agreements with Trade Provisions, 90-91 IN-
TERNATIONAL TRADE 45 (1992). This study lists 17 environmental conventions containing
trade provisions for reasons of environmental protection; this list includes, among others, the
1973 Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora
(CITES), the 1987 Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, and the
1989 Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes
and Their Disposal.
15. See Gabrielle Marceau, WTO Dispute Settlement and Human Rights, 13 EUR. J.
INT'L L. 753, 757 (2002).
16. Cf Declaration of Legal Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Explo-
ration and Use of Outer Space, G.A. Res. 1962, U.N. GAOR, 18th Sess., Supp. No. 15, at 15,
U.N. Doc. A/5515 (1964).
17. See Southern Bluefin Tuna Case (Australia & New Zealand v. Japan), Award on
Jurisdiction and Admissibility, ICSID (W. Bank) (Arbitral Tribunal constituted under
Annex VII of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 2000), at http://
www.worldbank.org/icsid/bluefintuna/award08O400.pdf.
18. See The MOX Plant Case (It. V. U.K. & N. It.) (Penn. Ct. Arb. 2003) transcript
of proceedings, June 13, 2003, available at http://www.pca-cpa.org/PDF/MOX%20%20-
%20Day%204.pdf.
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regimes. For example, does general international law apply to the legal
regimes of the European Union? If so, how? And does it matter whether
European law still qualifies as international law? A related, but more
fundamental, question concerns the accountability of international
organizations: to what extent are international organizations bound by
general international law?' 9 In particular, given that international human
rights regimes exhibit a tendency to specify specific features of the
applicable legal system,20 to what extent can general international law be
applied to the judicial functions of international organizations?
III. CAUSES
Most legal systems provide legal means and devices to solve possi-
ble conflicts of norms2' and ensure their harmonious application.
However, the international legal system cannot avoid normative conflicts
and inhomogeneous application because it lacks clear legal guidance for
the resolution of conflicts of norms. This situation threatens the unity of
the international legal system.
The absence of such rules regarding conflicting regulations can be
traced back to:
" Lack of centralized organs. In the decentralized system of in-
ternational law, the members of the system are individually
responsible for the enforcement of international law, making
it impossible to guarantee the homogeneous application of in-
ternational law.2
* The specialization of regulations. Due to a decentralized
method of norm creation, different regulations are applied in
different situations. Any resort to different systems for the regu-
lation of the same situation could lead to conflicting results.
19. See, e.g., de Wet, supra note 9, at 8; August Reinisch, Developing Human Rights
and Humanitarian Law Accountability of the Security Council for Imposition of Economic
Sanctions, 95 AM. J. INT'L L. 851, at 854 (2001).
20. See Alain Pellet, 'Droits-de-l'Hommisme' et Droit International ["Human rightism"
and International Law], Gilberto Amado Memorial Lecture at the Palace of Nations (July 18,
2000), available in translated and updated form in X THE ITALIAN YEARBOOK OF INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW 3 (2000).
21. For the definition of a normative conflict, see Wolfram Karl, Conflict Between Trea-
ties, in 4 ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 467 (Rudolf Bernhardt ed., 2000);
MARCEAU, supra note 15, at 792.
22. See Brownlie, supra note 2.
[Vol. 25:849
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Specialization also entails different regimes of secondary rules,
including enforcement and compliance mechanisms.23
* The different structures of legal norms.
* Classical international law consists of reciprocal norms of a
synallagmatic nature, i.e. norms creating bilateral reciprocal
rights and obligations among States;
" New developments of international law impose duties on
States owed to individuals such as norms protecting human
rights;
• Further developments created duties owed to the community
of States participating in a given legal system.
These different structures are favorable to the creation of different
normative regimes that could entail incompatible legal obligations for
the individual actors. Such regimes include:
* Parallel regulations on the universal or the regional level relat-24
ing to the same matter, which require a normative solution to
possible conflicts;
" Competing regulations25 where different regulation could be-
come applicable to the same situations or facts;
26
" Enlargement of the scope of international law, which is con-
ducive to specialized regulations with even more disparate
compliance mechanisms; and
" Different regimes of secondary rules.2
23. The existence of different mechanisms leads to a proliferation of dispute settlement
mechanisms. See Hafner, supra note 8.
24. The best examples are the different conventions regarding the use of international
watercourses such as the United Nations Convention on the Non-Navigational Use of Interna-
tional Watercourses of 1998, as opposed to the European Convention in international
watercourses of 1972 elaborated by the ECE.
25. For example, the overlap among: United Nations Convention to Combat Desertifica-
tion in Those Countries Experiencing Serious Draught and/or Desertification, Particularly in
Africa, June 17, 1994, 1954 U.N.T.S. 3; United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change, May 9, 1992, 1771 U.N.T.S. 107; Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone
Layer, Mar. 22, 1985, 1513 U.N.T.S. 293.
26. See SALINAS ALCEGA, ADAPTABILIDAD Y FRAGMENTACION DEL DERECHO INTERNA-
CIONAL: LA CRISIS DE LA SECTORIALIZACION 161, n.6 (1999); MALCOLM N. SHAW,
INTERNATIONAL LAW 39 (1986); Paul-Marie Dupuy, The Danger of Fragmentation or Unifica-
tion of the International Legal System and the International Court of Justice, 31 N.YU.J. INT'L
L. & POL. 791 (1999); Christopher A. Ford, Judicial Discretion in International Jurisprudence:
Article 3 8 (2 )(c) and "General Principles of Law," 5 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 35, 77 (1994-
96).
27. See IAN BROWNLIE, STATE RESPONSIBILITY 1 (1983); Robert Jennings, The Judicial
Enforcement of International Obligations, 47 Z. AUSL. OFF. RECHT VOLKERR. 3 (1987); G.M.
Summer 20041
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IV. THE EFFECTS OF FRAGMENTATION
A. The Negative Effect: A Threat to the Reliability and
Credibility of International Law
The disintegration of the legal order jeopardizes the credibility, reli-
ability, and, consequently, the authority of international law.
1. Substantive Law (Primary Rules)
As far as substantive law (in the sense of primary rules) is con-
cerned, we now face different regimes relating to the same issue. In this
regard, legal regimes of a general nature compete with regimes of a more
specific nature, requiring rules such as lex specialis to resolve contradic-
tions.
Growing sectionalism and regionalism around the globe has led to
the creation of new regional legal regimes, often more specific than
global regimes, geographically and otherwise, and more general than
national regimes. Such new legal regimes increase the opportunities for
friction. Thus, sectionalism and regionalism are powerful agents of in-
ternational cooperation but are not necessarily unmitigated blessings for
the development of international law.2
As shown above, multiple sets of international regulations may ap-
ply to a given situation. This diversity of applicable regulations
necessitates complex arguments about which regulation to apply, and
may give rise to more conflicts than were solved by the creation of each
individual legal regime.29 Diversity of primary rules could address spe-
cific problems better than a few global, universal regimes, leading to
increased attempts at compliance by States if they feel that compliance
will actually achieve results. However, regardless of any positive as-
White, Legal Consequences of Wrongful Acts in International Economic Law, 16 NETH. Y.B.
INT'L L. 137, 172 (1985); Karl Zemanek, The Unilateral Enforcement of International Obli-
gations, 47 Z. AUSL. OFF. RECHT VOLKERR. 32 (1987). Regarding the relationship between
general international law and subsystems, see generally AXEL MARSCHIK, SUBSYSTEME IM
VOLKERRECHT (1997). The core of the dispute regarding "self-contained regimes" is whether
case law may exclude the application of general secondary norms. See Bruno Simma, Self-
Contained Regimes, 16 NETH. Y.B. INT'L L. 111 (1985); Max Sorensen, Autonomous Legal
Orders: Some Considerations Relating to a Systems Analysis of International Organizations in
the World Legal Order, 32 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 575 (1983).
28. See William Elliott Butler, Regional and Sectional Diversities in International Law,
in INTERNATIONAL LAW: TEACHING AND PRACTICE 46 (Bin Cheng ed., 1982).
29. The most illustrative examples are presented by the question of whether human
rights or humanitarian law applies to the activities of the United Nations. See, e.g., Secretary-
General's Bulletin: Observance by United Nations Forces of International Humanitarian Law,
U.N. Secretariat, 54th Sess., at 1-3, U.N. Doc. STISGB/1999/13 (1999); de Wet, supra note 9,
at 8; Reinisch, supra note 19, at 854.
[Vol. 25:849
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sessment of multiplicity, it inevitably risks conflicts of obligations in-
cumbent on a State.
2. Secondary Rules
Fragmentation among the various regimes of international proce-
dural law, regimes intended to ensure the observance of primary
international law, is even more evident than fragmentation in primary
international law. The focus of international law has moved away from
the elaboration of substantive law of a general nature, and towards the
creation of special regimes and methods of enforcement (dispute avoid-
ance and dispute settlement mechanisms). Dispute settlement institutions
have proliferated. ° Unfortunately, major problems arise when a State
could resort to different mechanisms of enforcement (ranging from dis-
pute settlement to compliance mechanisms) in attempting to resolve one
problem.
Each enforcement mechanism considers itself committed first of all
to applying only its own system or subsystem of standards. Because
most organs, in particular the treaty bodies, may only apply their own
substantive law to disputes or situations brought before them (except, for
instance, the ICJ), States may engage in forum shopping, resorting to the
mechanism that corresponds best to their State interests. 3' Classical cases
of such forum shopping include the Matthews case before the European
• 31
Court of Human Rights, the case of Richard Waite and Terry Kennedy
30. See Jonathan I. Charney, The Impact on the International Legal System of the Growth
of International Courts and Tribunals, 31 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 697 (1999); Hafner, supra
note 8.
31. This term is used in the field of international private law. Cf. Roger M. Baron, Child
Custody Jurisdiction, 38 S.D. L. REV. 479, 492 (1993); Patrick J. Borchers, Forum Selection
Agreements in the Federal Courts After Carnival Cruise: A Proposal for Congressional Re-
form, 67 WASH. L. REV. 55, 96 (1992).
32. See Matthews v. United Kingdom, 28 Eur. Ct. H.R. 361 (1999). This case dealt with
the exclusion of Gibraltar from the franchise for the European parliamentary elections. The
exclusion was based on EC legislation, but the applicant claimed that the exclusion breached
Article 3 of Protocol No. I of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Funda-
mental Freedoms, which provides: "The High Contracting Parties undertake to hold free
elections at reasonable intervals by secret ballot, under conditions which will ensure the free
expression of the opinion of the people in the choice of the legislature." See Protocol to the
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, May 18, 1954, at
http://www.echr.coe.int/Convention/webConvenENG.pdf. The Court declared that there was:
[N]o difference between European and domestic legislation, and no reason why the
United Kingdom should not be required to "secure" the rights in Article 3 of Proto-
col No. 1 in respect of European legislation, in the same way as those rights are
required to be "secured" in respect of purely domestic legislation. In particular, the
suggestion that the United Kingdom may not have effective control over the state of
affairs complained of cannot affect the position, as the United Kingdom's responsi-
bility derives from its having entered into treaty commitments subsequent to the
Summer 2004]
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before the same court,3  and the Tadic and Nicaragua cases and the de-
bate they sparked.34
Furthermore, a settlement reached by one organ will only resolve a
dispute within that system and not necessarily for the purpose of another
or the universal system. This fact could therefore undermine any ten-
dency towards a homogeneous international law and system and could
engender an additional uncertainty of the standards to be applied to a
given case.
This fragmented nature of judicial activity is exacerbated by the lack
of exchange of information between and among dispute settlement bod-
ies. It is difficult for one institution to become acquainted with all the
ramifications of the judicial reasoning of another body, in particular if
the activity is not made public.
Thus the recent proliferation of secondary rules entails the risk of
divergent solutions, which could undermine the authority and credibility
of such institutions and of international law in general. While the system
of secondary norms underlying the primary norms of international law
does have a common core that helps define the normative nature of in-
ternational law,35 the diversity of the system tends to maintain or
aggravate the disintegrated nature of international law and the interna-
tional system as a whole.
applicability of Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 to Gibraltar, namely the Maastricht
Treaty taken together with its obligations under the Council Decision and the 1976
Act.
Matthews v. United Kingdom, 28 Eur. Ct. H.R. 361, para. 34 (1999). For this reason, the court
declared that the United Kingdom had breached its human rights obligations.
33. See Waite v. Germany, 6 Eur. Ct. H.R. 499, para. 73 (1999). In this case, the Court
had to decide the human rights of staff members of an international organization. The Court
came to the following conclusion:
Taking into account in particular the alternative means of legal process available to
the applicants, it cannot be said that the limitation on their access to the German
Courts with regard to ESA impaired the essence of their "right to a court" or was
disproportionate for the purposes of article 6 § 1."
Id. at para. 73.
34. The ICJ and the ICTY came to different conclusions on the legal effects of third
party involvement (specifically third party control of paramilitary forces), on armed conflicts,
and on the attributability of the use of force. Cf. Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicara-
gua v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14 , 64-65 (June 27); Prosecutor v. Tadic, 38 I.L.M. 1518, 1540-46
(Int'l Crim. Trib. for Former Yugo. 1999).
35. See ALLEGA & ROBLES, supra note 6, at 63.
[Vol. 25:849
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B. The Positive Effect: Tailored Laws
Are Worth Following
Counterpoint to the preceding parade of drawbacks regarding the
fragmentation of international law is the idea that fragmentation also
reflects a growing specialization of international regulations and re-
gimes. Specialization accommodates various needs and concerns of the
States engaged in international law-making, and States perceive that
their individual positions are better respected in these special regimes
than in the global one. One may reasonably expect that, under such cir-
cumstances, States will be more induced to comply with these
regulations and regimes.
Fragmentation reflects the necessity of offering different institutions
with different structures, which permits people to resort to the institutions
that is the best fit for a given dispute.36 Special regulations can better
accommodate the special needs of certain situations. For instance,
dispute settlement mechanisms may be tailored according to the special
circumstances, such as the International Law of the Sea Tribunal or the
Court of Conciliation and Arbitration within the Organization for
Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) 7 The latter requires the
conciliation commission to take into address specific commitments
under the OSCE documents. Additional examples of such laboratories of
international law are the so-called self-contained regimes, designed as
31such by the International Court of Justice in the Hostages case.
A less-than-global approach seems particularly necessary when dif-
ferent States clearly hold different beliefs about what basic values should
be preserved by international regulation. Illustration of these different
perceptions need not refer to the clash of civilizations; the simple fact of
reservations to human rights treaties suffices. Another example is in the
attempt to regulate the combat of terrorism; it is far easier to find com-
mon ground for a regulation, particularly a regulation defining terrorism,
within a region than in the universal context.39 Such specialized regimes
36. See Gerhard Hafner, The Physiognomy of Disputes and the Appropriate Means to
Resolve Them, in INTERNATIONAL LAW AS A LANGUAGE FOR INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 559
(1998).
37. See Gerhard Hafner, Das Streitbeilegungsiibereinkommen der KSZE: Cui bono?, in
VOLKERRECHT ZWISCHEN NORMATIVEM ANSPRUCH UND POLITISCHER REALITAT 115 (Konrad
Ginther et al. eds., 1994).
38. See Diplomatic and Consular Staff (U.S. v. Iran), 1980 I.C.J. 4 (May 24);
MARSCHIK, supra note 27, at 172; Axel Marschik, Too Much Order? The Impact of Special
Secondary Norms on the Unity and Efficacy of the International Legal System, 9 EUR. J. INT'L
L. 212, 238 (1998); ALCEGA & ROBLES, supra note 6, at 131.
39. See Gerhard Hafner, Certain Issues of the Work of the Sixth Committee of the 56th
General Assembly in 2001, 97 AM. J. INT'L L. 147, 157-58 (2003).
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could even be used to progressively develop international law and serve
as a precedent for a global regime.
Although problems inevitably result from the proliferation of special
regimes and regulations, just as indubitable is the potential for positive
effects on compliance with international law as well as on the stability
and predictability of international relations.
V. FURTHER PROBLEMS
A. The Problem of Lex Specialis
Although the Vienna Convention of the Law of Treaties (VCLT)
provides certain basic rules on the issue of priority when successive
treaties relate to the same object, they may not be entirely satisfactory
(e.g. the discussion of lex specialis).
Various solutions to the problem of conflicting treaty norms may be
found in Articles 30, 40, 41 and 59 of the VCLT, and particularly in Arti-
cle 30.40 However, Article 30 reflects the general rule of lex posterior
40. Article 30 reads:
Application of successive treaties relating to the same subject matter
I. Subject to Article 103 of the Charter of the United Nations, the rights and ob-
ligations of States parties to successive treaties relating to the same subject matter
shall be determined in accordance with the following paragraphs.
2. When a treaty specifies that it is subject to, or that it is not to be considered as
incompatible with, an earlier or later treaty, the provisions of that other treaty pre-
vail.
3. When all the parties to the earlier treaty are parties also to the later treaty but
the earlier treaty is not terminated or suspended in operation under article 59, the
earlier treaty applies only to the extent that its provisions are compatible with those
of the latter treaty.
4. When the parties to the later treaty do not include all the parties to the earlier
one:
(a) as between States parties to both treaties the same rule applies as in para-
graph 3;
(b) as between a State party to both treaties and a State party to only one of the
treaties, the treaty to which both States are parties governs their mutual rights
and obligations.
5. Paragraph 4 is without prejudice to article 41, or to any question of the termi-
nation or suspension of the operation of a treaty under article 60 or to any question
of responsibility which may arise for a State from the conclusion or application of a
treaty, the provisions of which are incompatible with its obligations towards another
State under another treaty.
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derogat priori, not the principle of specialty4' (lex specialis derogat gen-
erali or in toto iure genus per speciem derogatur). Furthermore, it is
generally recognized that the VCLT does not offer a solution to the prob-
lem of conflicting obligations owed by one State to different other
subjects of international law (e.g. if a State concludes two treaties with
two different States and one treaty cannot be observed without a viola-
tion of the second). The only rules that clearly determine the priority of
one regime are Article 103 Charter and norms of an imperative nature (as
far as they could be defined). 2
One possible way to solve the problem of priority is to include in
treaties explicit provisions regulating the possible conflict with other
treaties. This solution, however, suffers from at least two deficiencies.
First, such a treaty provision will apply only if the States involved are
parties to all relevant treaties. Second, most treaties already enacted do
not include such clauses, and when treaties conflict and one or more
lacks such a clause, the precise legal relationship or priority of the trea-
ties will be unclear.
In light of the growing integration of the world community ("global-
ization") on the one hand, and the proliferation of subsystems on the
other, the need to take measures to ensure the unity of the international
legal order will increase.
VI. PRESENT WORK ON THIS ISSUE
This particular problem does not lend itself to a solution through
regulation; at least not yet. Several authors refer to the possibility of en-
dowing the ICJ with some sort of monitoring authority in order to ensure
41the coherence and harmony of the international legal order. Such an ap-
proach would bring the international legal order closer to an authoritative
legal system with public law elements than it is now. Seen in this perspec-
tive, the ICJ would become a central legal authority with the power to
review decisions of other international tribunals. The ICJ, however, does
not yet possess this competence, other tribunals have more specialized
41. It is particularly for this reason that one of the issues that the Working Group on
Fragmentation in the ILC will discuss is the issue of the function and scope of the lex specialis
rule and the question of "self-contained regimes." See Report of the International Law Com-
mission, U.N. GAOR, 54th Sess., Suppl. 10, at 241, U.N. Doc. A/57/10 (2002).
42. See id. This issue will be discussed under the title: Hierarchy in international law:
jus cogens, obligations erga omnes, and Article 103 of the Charter of the United Nations as
conflict rules.
43. On the question of whether the judicial function should be centralized, see Rosalyn
Higgins, Presentation of the Topic, in Proceedings of the United Nations Congress of Public
International Law, in INTERNATIONAL LAW AS A LANGUAGE FOR INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
111 (1998).
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competences, and installing the ICJ as a central legal authority would only
produce harmony in international law ex post, i.e. after a conflict has al-
ready arisen.
The ILC has begun work on this topic, first under the chairmanship
of Judge Simma, then, after his election as judge of the ICJ, under Judge
Koskenniemi. The working group has issued a preliminary report enti-
tled "Fragmentation of international law: difficulties arising from the
diversification and expansion of international law." In it, the working
group proposed to deal first with the following items:
• The function and scope of the lex specialis rule and the ques-
tion of "self-contained regimes;"
* The interpretation of treaties in the light of "any relevant rules
of international law applicable in the relations between the par-
ties" (Article 31 (3) (c) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties), in the context of general developments in interna-
tional law and contemporary concerns of the community of
nations;
• The application of successive treaties relating to the same
subject matter (Article 30 of the Vienna Convention on the
Law of Treaties);
* The modifications of multilateral treaties between certain of
the parties only (Article 41 of the Vienna Convention on the
Law of Treaties);
• Hierarchy in treaty law: jus cogens, obligations erga omnes,
Article 103 of the Charter of the United Nations, as conflict
rules.'
VII. CONCLUSIONS
Although the discussion of the fragmentation of international law
has only just begun, it has already engaged many different groups and
bodies. What can be derived from the discussion is the following:
* International law is not a homogeneous body;
• The problem of diversification arises with relation to primary
and secondary rules;
• Fragmentation reflects the present multilayer situation of inter-
national law (including the emancipation of the individuals),
44. See Report of the International Law Commission, supra, note 41, at 241.
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may induce States to comply with international law more rig-
orously, and may contribute to a progressive development of
international law, but
Fragmentation also creates problems.
There is no one single solution to the problem of conflict among the
fragments of international law. Different solutions are needed for
primary rules and for secondary rules, in particular in designing
mechanisms of conflict avoidance and conflict solution. Although the
international legal system already provides certain solutions to the
problems discussed above, only when the international community is
made fully aware of such problems can the disintegrative effect of
fragmentation be eliminated.
